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Editorial 
Agency, autonomy and self-determination: Questioning key 
concepts of childhood studies 
Ferdinand Sutterlüty1 
E. Kay M. Tisdall2 
 
Abstract 
Children’s agency has become a popularised conceptual and practical concern, following 
the rise of the ‘new’ sociology of childhood and the wide-spread ratification of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The promotion of children’s agency captured 
adults’ wish to recognise children in their own right, that children are social actors in 
their families, communities and societies, and that their participation rights need to be 
promoted. However, recent deliberations in childhood studies have encouraged a harder 
look at children’s agency on practical and theoretical grounds. This special journal issue 
addresses this agenda in three ways: to consider theoretical resources for re-framing 
agency and children’s agency and, in particular, to make it more empirically useful in 
research and practice; to consider underlying concepts (such as vulnerability and 
competence), and whether they limit or enhance children’s agency; and to develop 
alternative concepts, namely autonomy and self-determination, which may better support 
recognition of children as social actors and their rights. 
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Over the past two decades, there has been an explosion of interest in ‘children as agents’. 
Article after article, and project after project, have sought to identify and promote 
children’s agency (for comment, see James, 2010; Tisdall and Punch, 2012). This 
correlated with the academic growth of the ‘new’ sociology of childhood (which 
broadened out with ever-increasing interdisciplinary interest to ‘childhood studies’) and 
the promotion of children’s rights through the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
Both the political and research agendas came together, with adults wanting to 
acknowledge children in their own right, whose participation should be recognised and 
supported in decision-making, and whose ‘voices’ should be heard and not only spoken 
for by their parents or concerned professionals. 
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In fact, the early and seminal writings in the ‘new’ sociology of childhood (e.g. writings 
by Allison James, Alan Prout, William Corsaro, Chris Jenks and more) rarely used, let 
alone defined, children’s agency or children as agents. A few traces can be found, such as 
Mayall (2002) and James and James (2004). But there was little definition and scant 
conceptual discussion. In the core description of the paradigm in James and Prout (1990), 
the phrase ‘children as social actors’ features rather than conceptualises children as 
agents. Yet, the subsequent research and associated literature frequently asserted the term 
‘agency’, with explicit intentions to recognise and promote children’s agency. Often 
studies were in-depth and qualitative, with a predominance of ethnographic methods, 
which demonstrated the ways children were agents in their own lives, families and 
communities (James, 2010). 
In recent years, a growing chorus of childhood studies’ academics have encouraged a 
harder look at children’s agency: to question its application as always being helpful to 
analysis and practice; and to scrutinise its theoretical content. In its application, children’s 
agency is problematic in numerous ways. As laid out by Tisdall and Punch (2012), and 
others, those writing in the childhood studies field have tended to assume children’s 
agency is innately and inevitably positive, thus making it problematic if in the particular 
circumstances children’s agency seemed questionable. For example, what does the 
academic or practitioner do with the ‘ambiguous agency’ of children and young people 
(Bordonaro and Payne, 2012; Edmonds, this issue) or with children’s agency that goes 
against social norms (e.g. ‘child soldiers’, ‘child prostitutes’, or ‘working children’)? 
A celebration of children’s agency can ignore how some children are highly 
circumscribed by their contexts or other circumstances, failing to perceive how children’s 
agency is ‘thinned’ by such aspects rather than ‘thickened’ (Klocker, 2007). Agency can 
be used as if it were something that children possessed, rather than something that is 
relational and expressed in relationships. Thus a child can be presented as not having 
agency – and blamed, seen as vulnerable or ignored – or as having agency – which is 
usually viewed positively and reported by the research. Theoretically, this has led to a 
range of writings (e.g. see Esser et al., 2016; Spyrou, 2018), which suggest that children’s 
agency needs to be considered relationally: bringing in materiality and non-human 
resources or affordances (Prout, 2005; Gallacher, 2015; Gallagher, this issue; Sultan and 
Andresen, this issue); perceiving children in context and in relationships with other 
people (Punch, 2016); and recognising the structures of intergenerational orders 
(Leonard, 2015). Wyness captures several of these ideas in his description of agency: 
Children as agents are immersed within the social world and thus embedded in 
relations within which they have a formative influence. The child agent is not 
only capable but also fully social. Agency cannot simply be equated with 
individual choice or individual autonomy (Valentine 2011), it needs to be viewed 
as a relational concept, an effect of complex shifting social arrangements. 
(Wyness, 2015: 13) 
 
Wyness introduces the term ‘autonomy’, as intertwined but distinguishable from 
children’s agency. According to Nunner-Winkler, autonomy can be distinguished from 
‘self-determination’ and defined as follows: Self-determination is attributed to an 
independent, informed formation of opinion about important aspects of one’s life. 
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Autonomy is the more demanding term insofar as it means a kind of self-rule in which 
orientation-providing norms must additionally come with a justification of their validity 
(Nunner-Winkler, 2008, 2017). These definitions arguably need expansion, as they are 
too cognitivist or rationalistic (cf. Honneth, 1995), but they show the normative core of 
the related concepts. This is pivotal for today’s culture and ‘orders of justification’ 
(Weber, 1969; Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006; Honneth, 2010), i.e. normative principles 
that legitimise society’s basic structures such as generational or gender orders. Those 
who advocate ‘self-determination’ and ‘autonomy’ as key concepts for childhood studies 
rely on today’s normative orders that, while being averse to external determination and 
heteronomous claims, are centred in the idea of personal self-rule and self-realisation. 
Specifically the notion of autonomy is deeply rooted in the modern history of ideas, 
stemming back to Kant, and seems to be promising specifically to explain the normative 
agenda of childhood studies. It is already inextricably linked to children’s rights and legal 
principles such as child welfare (Sutterlüty, 2017; Daly et al., this issue). Whereas the 
concept of agency is only implicitly normative or crypto-normative, autonomy itself 
denotes a normative principle. In addition to that, discourses on autonomy not only 
reflect on the social conditions that facilitate self-determined decision-making but also on 
the related preconditions in regard to self-knowledge and self-respect of the acting 
subject (Roessler, 2015). Applying these discourses to children could be helpful to 
overcome paternalism and other attitudes that render them intrinsically immature, 
dependent and powerless. 
In this light, autonomy can be seen as the ideal conceptual candidate for addressing 
childhood studies’ normative agenda: Who, if not the child himself or herself, should be 
allowed to determine his or her fate? Because there seems to be only one answer to this 
question it could be concluded that, given contemporary normative orders, autonomy 
should arguably become the new core concept of childhood studies rather than agency. 
It is timely to consider what concepts, and concomitant theoretical heritages and 
possibilities, will best explain and support the recognition of children as social actors. 
This agenda has a normative base, in accepting that children are indeed social actors, and 
such an acceptance has implications for their recognition and participation within their 
families, communities, services and systems. The agenda has policy and practice 
implications, as all of these arenas still often struggle to respect children’s dignity and 
recognise and promote their contributions. 
This special issue of Global Studies of Childhood takes on this agenda. The issue draws 
on papers presented at a seminar organised in December 2017, by Sutterlüty and Tisdall, 
at the Institute for Social Research at Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. Following 
the intensive discussion over two days, key papers were revised for this journal and 
others invited to complement the analytical developments. Broadly, the special issue 
addresses children up to the age of 18, as defined by the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (UNCRC). 
The special issue explores one avenue, which considers whether the theoretical and 
practical possibilities of agency can be further investigated, challenged and reframed. 
Several articles undertake this, in different ways. Gallagher’s article ‘Rethinking 
children’s agency: Power, assemblages, freedom and materiality’ connects a critical 
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reconsideration of agency with wider questions about relations between children, 
materials and non-humans. He ends by offering a set of four principles to focus attention 
on what agency does and analytical resources to explore children’s relations with other 
kinds of materials, forces and bodies. Edmonds uses empirical experiences from research 
in Africa, to critique how children’s agency is used in development contexts, in her 
article ‘Making children’s “agency” visible: Towards the localisation of a concept in 
theory and practice’. She argues for new directions in research and practice, to consider 
agency in socio-cultural terms that help animate local concepts of agency. 
Another avenue investigates underlying or associated concepts that drive or block 
children from expressing their agency and recognition as social actors. Moran-Ellis and 
Tisdall pick up one of those concepts, competence, for a critical consideration in their 
article titled ‘The relevance of “competence” for enhancing or limiting children’s 
participation: Unpicking conceptual confusion’. They identified 67 articles published in 
six childhood studies’ journals over 10 years, where ‘competence’ and its variations 
appear in the abstract. Generally, they find a lack of definitional clarity, a range of uses 
made of the term, and the risk that such uses of competence undermine claims for 
children’s participation. They recommend greater epistemological clarity in the field, if 
competence were to be an effective concept to promote children as social actors and their 
participation. Sultan and Andresen consider the relationships between vulnerability and 
agency, in their article ‘“A child on drugs”: Conceptualising childhood experiences of 
agency and vulnerability’. Whereas drug use is generally only seen as shaped by and 
creating vulnerability, their article suggests it can also create new connections with 
certain environments and become a source of agency for child and adolescent drug users. 
Rather than embracing the concept of vulnerability, Daly and colleagues argue against its 
application to disabled children, as dangerously limiting their access to information on 
sexual education. Instead, they argue for a relational concept of autonomy that recognises 
disabled children’s rights to education and information and adult responsibilities to 
facilitate these, in their article titled ‘Vulnerable subjects and autonomous actors: The 
right to sexuality education for disabled under-18s’. In the final article, Mühlbacher and 
Sutterlüty also argue for the concept of autonomy, to replace agency as a primarily 
descriptive concept with a limited normative potential. In their article ‘The principle of 
child autonomy: A rationale for the normative agenda of childhood studies’, they provide 
a fulsome critique of child agency and develop a social concept of child autonomy. While 
they support the normative aim of the agency concept, they argue that this aim is better 
retained and more fully expressed by the notion of autonomy. 
Together, we suggest that the articles in this special issue intersect in provocative ways. 
For example some concepts are fundamentally questioned – such as agency and 
competency – with calls for either greater specification or abandoning them for others. 
Vulnerability is subject to attention, either as a concept to embrace (Gallagher; Sultan and 
Andresen) or as fundamentally limiting and unhelpful (Daly and colleagues). Autonomy 
is recast by two articles (Daly and colleagues; Mühlbacher and Sutterlüty), while 
Edmonds discounts its applicability in more relational cultures and instead advocates re-
working agency from local vantage points. The articles have practical and policy 
implications, in questioning underlying assumptions, offering new lenses and challenging 
ways to recognize and promote children as social actors. Both individually and 
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collectively, the articles in this special journal issue stretch the underpinnings of 
childhood studies in theoretically productive ways – with the intention of providing both 
contributions to childhood studies as well as broader literatures not yet permeated by 
childhood considerations. 
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